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Abstract
We use hedonic rent and wage equations to measure the compensating differentials that
obtain in central cities with franchises of the National Football League.  We use repeated
observations of cities over time and thereby obtain identification of the NFL effect through
franchise expansion and movement.  We find that rents are roughly 8 percent higher and wages
are 4 percent lower in cities with franchises, though the latter of these two effects is not
significant. Thus, professional sports franchises appear to be a public good by adding to the
quality-of-life in cities.  Our findings suggest that once the quality-of-life benefits are included in
the calculus, the seemingly large public expenditure on new stadiums appears to be a good
investment for cities and their residents. 3
1.  Measuring the Impact of Sports Franchises
Cities, states, and metropolitan areas have on occasion spent large sums of money in an
attempt to lure or retain professional sports franchises.  These incentives are not necessarily
direct payments; they are nearly always an agreement to subsidize construction or renovation of
a publicly financed stadium, along with a leasing arrangement that provides substantial
amounts of the revenue generated by the stadium to the team itself.  Zaretsky (2001) states that at
least $5 billion of state and local tax revenue were spent between 1987 and 1999, and projects in
the works in 1999 were expected to draw another $9 billion to $11 billion more from public
funds.   In addition, contracts between these publicly funded facilities and team owners often
yield substantial further benefits to the owners by providing them with generous shares of the
revenue from parking and concessions.  A striking example noted in Leeds and von Allmen
(2002) is the case of Eli Jacobs, former owner of the Baltimore Orioles, who, in his bankruptcy
proceedings, listed the Orioles stadium lease as his most valuable asset.  
What do cities hope to gain in exchange for such concessions?  Civic boosters and city
officials often think of professional sports as a way of boosting both civic pride and economic
activity within a city.  A typical statement expressing these sentiments comes from Philadelphia
mayor John Street:
“We are incredibly fortunate to be the home of great professional sports  franchises.  They
enrich our community, fortify our tax base, and provide major support for the region's
future economic growth. And then there are the intangible benefits: These Phillies, if we
give them our full support, will bring us together; solidify a sense of community with
civic pride as they drive toward the pennant.”  (Street, 2001) 4
It is fair to say that economists have cast a skeptical eye on the claim that professional
sports franchises contribute to the economic health of the surrounding area, regardless of how
that surrounding area is defined.  At the city level, Coates and Humphreys (1999) examine the
correlation between per capita personal income and the existence of sports teams in metropolitan
areas and find little evidence that the two are linked.  Baade and Sanderson (1997) look at
employment rather than income, and while certain sectors closely related to professional sports
do show some employment gain, aggregate employment, even allowing for the possibility of
Keynesian-type multiplier effects, shows little impact from the existence of sports teams that are,
after all, a set of relatively small firms that directly employ a rather small number of people who,
while very highly paid, very often do not live year-round in the community.  Moreover, the
spending that occurs in relation to professional sporting events may result from substituting
away from other recreational activities.  
Even at a more micro-level, employment benefits in the immediate location of the
stadium seem fairly minimal.  A number of studies in Noll and Zimbalist (1997) address this
issue and find this to be the case (see, for example, Austrian and Rosentraub (1997)).  
Yet city boosters and politicians continue to try to make the case for professional sports
and the beneficial role they might play in the community.  If this beneficial role does not arise
from Keynesian-type impacts, it must be because benefits accrue to those who consume
professional sports’ services.  Alexander, Kern, and Neill (2000) attempt to measure the demand
and, by extension, the consumer surplus that attendees receive from paying admission to
sporting events.  One might justify subsidization if the surplus exceeds the city’s subsidization of
the team. However, these authors do not find that to be the case; the surplus is less than the
subsidies.  
In arguing the case against the impact of sports teams, our view is that all of these studies
miss one basic point: professional sports are, at some level, a nonexcludable public good.  It is
possible that people obtain benefits from having a sports team even if they never go to see a
game.  They root for the local athletes, look forward to reading about their success or failure in5
the newspaper, and share in the city-wide joy when the home team wins a championship.1   The
words of Mayor Street quoted above speak to the “civic pride” that can result from a successful
franchise, such that one ought to think of a professional sports team in the way one thinks of a
new art museum or new symphony hall or indeed an environmental resource like an old-growth
forest — something from which one receives utility just from having it around.  Perhaps more
important — in the words of Art Modell, controversial owner of the Cleveland Browns-
Baltimore Ravens franchise: “The pride and the presence of a professional football team is far
more important than 30 libraries” (quoted in Leeds and von Allmen, 2002).  
This paper contends that these benefits are measurable via compensating differentials —
in the same way that people are willing to pay for other contributors to the quality of life in the
area, such as clean air (Kiel and Zabel, 2000; Gyourko and Tracy (1991)). If people like having a
professional sports franchise in their community, they are presumably willing to pay for it, if not
directly through the purchase of season tickets, then indirectly through an increased willingness
to pay for housing in the area, and through an increased willingness to accept marginally lower
wages.   
The idea that compensating differentials might provide a basis for the social benefit of
sports teams was first broached by Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001), who argue that while such
differentials may exist,  correlations between the presence of sports teams on the one hand and
wages and rents on the other will surely be confounded with the correlation between these
variables and city size (and perhaps other city-specific characteristics).  We confront this issue by
relying on a two-period panel of individual data and using city fixed effects to control for all
city-specific, time invariant characteristics that contribute to wage and rent determination,
including, but not limited to, city size.  In the context of a hedonic wage or rent regression, the
compensating differential effect of a professional sports franchise is measured by the coefficient
of a dummy variable indicating the presence of a franchise in the particular city and year.  Given
                                                          
1Though not, hopefully, in the riots that have become all too common on such occasions. 6
the existence of fixed city effects, the identification of this NFL effect then comes from league
expansion and franchise movements into and out of cities over the years between the two panel
observations.  
Our two dates are 1993 and 1999.  We focus our attention on NFL football franchises, for
two obvious reasons.  The first is the pre-eminent attention the NFL receives among all sports in
the United States.  The second is that the most serious rival for that attention, Major League
Baseball, has had very little expansion in recent years and no franchise movements since the
early 1970s.   The NFL on the other hand has had a bit more expansion and substantially more
franchise movement.  Particularly important is the exodus of the NFL from Los Angeles, the
nation’s second largest metropolitan area, which will help eliminate the contention that our
results are related to city size.
We construct hedonic rent and wage equations at the individual level, using data from
the Annual Housing Survey for the former and the Current Population Survey for the latter. We
control (as noted) for city fixed effects, time fixed effects, a large number of time-varying city
characteristics,  a large number of individual characteristics, and in the case of the Annual
Housing Survey rent equation, a random effect that controls for individual time-invariant
characteristics.  Despite all of these (and other) controls, we find that the presence of an NFL
franchise raises annual rents by approximately 8 percent and that the standard error on the
coefficient allows rejection of the usual null hypothesis at any standard level of type I error.   
The corresponding coefficient from the wage equation indicates that wages in NFL cities
fall approximately 4 percent; however, the coefficient is not significant at the usual levels. Our
overall conclusion, nevertheless, is that NFL franchises do contribute to the quality of life.  7
2.  The Rental Equation
We assume that rents for household (i) in city (j) at time (t) can be represented by the
following semi-log form:  
12 log ijt i ijt jt jt j ijt RX Z N F L D T          (1)
Where: 
log ijt R  = monthly rent paid by household i in city j at time t.
ijt X = a vector of housing characteristics for household i in city j at time t.
jt Z = a vector of time-varying city characteristics j. 
jt NFL = dummy variable indicating the presence of an NFL team in city j in year t. Coded with
the value 1 if MSA j had a team in year t; if it did not, the value is zero. (Note: this is a single
variable.)
j D = dummy variable for each city coded 1 for a specific city, 0 otherwise. 
T   = time dummy variable coded 1 if the observation is 1993, 0 if 1999.
22 , where  (0, ),  (0, ). ijt ijt i ijt i NN       
The error structure suggests an error term with two components. The component  ijt  is
the traditional error term unique to each observation and is taken to be uncorrelated across
observations and uncorrelated through time. The component i   is the random disturbance
characterizing the ith observation and is constant through time. 8
Table 1 shows the 32 cities that had an NFL team in either 1993 or 1999.  Eight of these
cities had a change in NFL team status between 1993 and 1999. Six cities (Baltimore, Charlotte,
Jacksonville, Nashville, Oakland, and Saint Louis) did not have an NFL franchise in 1993 but had
gained one by 1999. Three cities (Houston, Los Angeles, and Anaheim (Orange County)) hosted
an NFL team in 1993, but did not do so in 1999.  Twenty-four cities hosted an NFL team in both
1993 and 1999.2 
Data. We elected to use individual households for the 60 largest MSAs for two time
periods: 1993 and 1999. The 60 largest metropolitan areas are chosen because they are the ones
most likely to already have or to be in the running for an NFL team. Data for rent and housing
characteristics are taken from the American Housing Survey (AHS).  However, for some of these
MSAs, the AHS either did not report observations for any households or the number of
household observations was insufficient to be included in our sample.  Thus, our final sample
consists of almost 6100 rental units in 53 of the 60 largest MSAs for which AHS data are
available.  Unfortunately, data are not available for two cities that currently have an NFL team:
Buffalo and Charlotte. Data are also not available for Green Bay, Wisconsin.  In this case we used
data for the Milwaukee MSA. Table 2 shows the MSAs used in the study ranked by population
size of their CMSAs or MSAs.  The New York CMSA is the largest metropolitan area, containing
over 20,000,000 people, while the Providence MSA is the smallest, with just under 1,000,000
people in 1999. The mean population size for these metropolitan areas is just under 3,000,000
people.
We performed analyses on both the entire sample and a sample of only the residents of
the central city.  On the one hand, the real life cost-benefit calculation will often take place at the
level of the central city, since that entity often provides the bulk of the metropolitan area’s
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subsidy to NFL teams.3  Second, as pointed out by Gyourko and Tracy (1991), “It is important
that the dependent variable (rent) pertain to the same jurisdiction as the right-hand-side fiscal
measures.” On the other hand, much of the benefit to franchises we are thinking about may
accrue to those outside the central city, and indeed, if compensating differentials exist for the
entire area, this would provide a justification for subsidization to arise from a broader tax base
than the central city alone.
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that presence (or absence) of an NFL team is
capitalized in land prices and hence rents. Housing is essentially a bundle of characteristics:
bedrooms, bathrooms, local amenities, etc. There is a vast literature on hedonic models applied
to housing markets to estimate the implicit prices of the various characteristics.4  We assume that
the systematic portion of rent is determined by a rental unit’s physical characteristics and by
characteristics of the city in which the rental unit is located. As indicated, the data for rents,  ijt R ,
and housing characteristics,  ijt X , are taken from the AHS.  Fixed effects (the j D ’s in the model)
are used to capture the effects on rents due to city-specific characteristics that are time invariant,
e.g., nearness to an ocean.  In addition, a number of time varying city characteristics,  jt Z , are
included in the model.  These include MSA population size, MSA population growth,
unemployment rate, violent crimes per capita, an air quality index (AQI), central city spending
per capita, and central city tax per capita.5  
                                                          
3 While a metropolitan area’s suburban residents provide subsidies indirectly via the state government, state subsidies
to teams are also financed by state residents who live outside the metropolitan area receiving the subsidy. 
4 Sheppard (1999) provides a thorough review of hedonic analysis of housing markets.
5Since PMSAs are treated as MSAs in this study, we refer to them as MSAs.  We do not consider consolidated
metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) in any of the regressions in this study.  Population growth between 1980 and
1990 is used for the 1993 observations.  Population growth between 1990 and 1996 is used for the 1999 observations.
Violent crimes per capita are as reported by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) calculates the AQI for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The EPA uses five major air
pollutants regulated by the Clean Air Act: ground-level ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide,
and nitrogen dioxide. For each of these pollutants, the EPA has established national air quality standards to protect
against harmful health effects.  The index used in the empirical model of this paper reports on the number of days in10
If the NFL placed teams in relatively fast growing cities, our NFL dummy variable could
be upwardly biased.  Four of the six cities that gained an NFL franchise between 1993 and 1999
had growth rates of their metropolitan population exceeding the national average of 9.6 percent
during the period 1990-99 (Charlotte at 22 percent, Nashville at 19 percent, Jacksonville at 16.5
percent, and Oakland at 11.4 percent).  Still, two cities that gained an NFL team between 1993
and 1999 had metropolitan population growth rates well below the national average during the
period 1990-99 (St. Louis at 3.1 percent and Baltimore at 4.6 percent). In addition, two cities that
lost an NFL franchise between 1993 and 1999 had metropolitan population growth rates
exceeding the national average (Houston at 20.7 and Los Angeles 10.4 percent). Further, the
owners have an economic incentive to seek out the city offering the best stadium deal, since the
NFL shares its television and merchandising revenue equally among all teams. (The Rams’ move
from Los Angeles to St. Louis is a case is point.)  Population growth is included as a regressor in
the regressions that follow to control for the fact that NLF expansion and movement have some
tendency to locate in relatively fast growing metropolitan areas.  As it turns out, the NFL and
MSA growth variable are negatively correlated (correlation coefficient of –0.1833).  Similarly, a
relatively low correlation is found between the presence of an NFL team and MSA population
size (correlation coefficient of 0.2884).
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for all of the variables in the rent
regressions, with the exception of the city-specific dummy variables. For example, the time
dummy variable was assigned a value of unity if the observation was in 1993, zero otherwise.
The table shows that 53 percent of the observations were in 1993. The average unit was about 46
                                                                                                                                                                                            
1993 and 1999 that the AQI for a given MSA was greater than 100. Data for both central city spending per capita and
central city tax per capita were found in the City and County Data Book.11
years old.  The table shows that 68 percent of the households in our sample resided in a city that
had an NFL team in either 1993 or 1999. 
A pooled cross-section time-series model consisting of 6087 observations forms the basis
of the regression analysis.  The first column of Table 4 presents the results from the pooled OLS
regression.  The regression explains 43 percent of the variation in rents.  In general, the results
are in line with expectations.  A few variables, however, have unanticipated signs.  The air
quality index is positive and significant.  Other things equal, we expect rent to be negatively
correlated with poorer air quality index.  Since we did not control for population density, the
positive correlation between air quality and rent may reflect the fact that both air quality and
rent are positively correlated with density.  We also find that local fiscal variables have the
wrong sign. Taxes per capita are positively correlated with rent; however, this variable is not
significant.  More troubling is the finding that public spending per capita is negative and
significant.  In some ways these anomalies are not too surprising, since local fiscal variables are
notoriously hard to measure. Still, the vast majority of the variables have the anticipated sign
and many are highly significant. Most important is the finding that the NFL dummy variable is
positive, as expected, and highly significant, suggesting an 8 percent premium on average. 
One problem with OLS estimation is that it restricts the constant term (the  ' i s  ) to be
identical across individuals in the sample.  A fixed effects specification allows for differences
across individuals to be captured by differences in the constant term.  This specification drops all
time-invariant variables, such as the city dummy variables. An alternative is a random effects
specification where the component i   is the random disturbance characterizing the ith
observation and is constant through time. Estimating (1) by OLS assumes that the individual-
specific error component is zero, that is,
2 0    .  It is well known that if 
2 0    , standard errors12
produced by OLS estimation are downward biased.  To test for the appropriateness of OLS
versus random effects, we performed the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrangian multiplier test
(LM) based on the residuals from the pooled OLS regression for the hypothesis that
2
0 H: 0      versus the alternative 
2
1 H: 0    .  For our data LM = 217.42 having a probability
value of zero, strongly indicating the presence of an individual-specific error component. The
results for the random-effects specification, reported in the second column of Table 4, are very
similar to the results from an OLS regression reported in the first column of the table.6   Most
important for our purposes is that the estimated coefficient on the NFL dummy variable is
virtually identical in both specifications of the model. 
A limitation of the random-effects specification is the assumption that  i   is uncorrelated
with the other regressors. Hausman (1978) proposed a test of this assumption based on the
differences between the random-effects and fixed-effects estimates.  Since fixed-effects estimation
is consistent when  i   and the regressors are correlated, but the random-effects estimator is not, a
statistically significant difference between these two methods is taken as evidence against the
random-effects assumption.  We performed the Hausman test for our sample and found that we
can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients from the two estimations are the same. 
Both the OLS and random-effects estimates of equation (1) assume homoskedasticity of
the error term,  ijt  . The error term may, however, have nonconstant variance. To account for this
possibility, both the OLS and random-effects versions were re-estimated using the White robust
errors procedure in STATA to take heteroskedasticity into account. The third column of Table 4
reports the findings for the White robust errors procedure for the random-effects version of the
                                                          
6 See Greene (1997) for details of the Lagrangian multiplier test. We also ran a fixed-effects version of the model,
and the estimated coefficient on the NFL variable is essentially identical to the estimate obtained for that variable in
the random-effects estimation.13
model.7  Once again, the findings are very similar to those for the other specifications of the
model. 
Another issue is that we do not have 6087 independent observation, since each of these
observations belongs to one of 53 well-defined clusters (a specific city).  Unless there is no
correlation within clusters, the usual standard errors calculated by OLS and random-effects
estimation are incorrect. Since there is likely to be a city effect that induces correlation among
different households within the city, we correct OLS standard errors for cluster sampling, as well
as for heteroskedasticity in the next regression and all regressions to follow.  The regression
reported in the fourth column in Table 4 corrects the standard errors for cluster sampling, as well
as for heteroskedasticity.  The coefficient on the NFL dummy variable is unchanged (as
expected), and it remains highly significant.  
Another issue is that some states may have engaged more actively in economic
development policies than other states.  These states may have been successful in landing an
NFL team as well as other types of activity, such as convention centers or business in general.
Since these types of state policies affect local growth and local rents, part of the correlation
between our NFL variable and rent may be due to a common state effect.  To control for this, a
state level dummy variable was interacted with the time dummy variable and added to the
regression. As indicated, we also corrected the standard errors for cluster sampling, as well as for
heteroskedasticity.  The results for this regression are given in the final column of Table 4.  The
findings for this version of the model are consistent with other versions reported in the table.
The coefficient on the NFL variable is positive and highly significant, although the value on this
coefficient is slightly lower (8.1 percent as opposed to 8.4 percent) than found in previous
regressions.  
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With an average monthly rent of almost $500 across cities in the sample, the finding of
roughly an 8.0 percent average rental premium implies an implicit price of about $40 per month
per unit, or $480 annually in cities hosting an NFL teams. To be on the conservative side, let’s
consider the lower bound of the amenity premium estimate of 2.9 percent. This implies an
implicit price of $14.50 per month per unit, or $174 annually.  The average central city in our
sample had a population of 753,705 in 1999.  According to the Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. there
were 2.6 people per household in 1999, suggesting there are almost 290,000 households in a
typical central city. This implies that the aggregate amenity value to living in a city that hosts an
NFL team is about $50 million per year, on average. The average value for hosting an NFL team
for 20 years is about $530 million. According to Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001), the public’s
share of the cost of a new football stadium has averaged $200 million. The lower-bound estimate
of the amenity value for hosting an NFL team is obviously well above the public’s share of the
cost of a new football stadium.  Thus, our results suggest that hosting an NFL franchise strongly
contributes to the quality of life.  While large public expenditures on the construction of new
sports stadiums is, and will continue to be, controversial, our findings suggest that once the
quality-of-life benefits are included in the calculus, public spending on new stadiums appears to
be a good investment for cities and their residents.  
While this estimate of the benefit may appear to be large, it’s consistent with estimates
found in other studies that have quantified the benefits for various types of amenities.  For
example, Gyourko and Tracy (1991) find that the annual value for just one extra sunny day is $7
per year per household, and Blomquist et al. (1988) find an annual value of $12. Our average city,
with 300,000 households, should be willing to pay between $2.1 million and $3.6 million per year
for an extra sunny day.  15
Rapppaport and Wilkerson (2001) point out that the actions of most cities that lost an
NFL franchise tend to place a high valuation on hosting a team. They point out that of the six
cities that have lost NFL teams since 1980, “All but Los Angeles subsequently allocated
considerably more public financing to attract a new NFL team than it would have cost to keep
their old team.” For example, voters in St. Louis approved $280 million in public funds to build a
new football stadium after the Cardinals departed for Arizona in 1987.  St. Louis voters declined
to allocate $120 million toward a new stadium when the Cardinals were playing in St. Louis.
Rapppaport and Wilkerson take this, and other similar increases in the willingness on the part of
cities to increase public funding for new NFL stadiums after losing a team, as evidence that the
quality-of-life benefits associated with hosting an NFL team may justify the seemingly large
public expenditures.
Evidence from MSA Level Data.  Up to this point we have limited our analysis of the
quality-of-life benefit to hosting an NFL team to the central city.  Obviously, many of the city’s
suburban residents derive benefits from living in a metropolitan area that’s home to a team.  This
may justify the subsidies given to NFL teams by state governments.  Unfortunately, there are not
enough observations on suburban rental units in a number of the cities used in this study;
Jacksonville and Memphis are two such cases.  Since these two cities got teams through
expansion in the 1990s, their omission would greatly reduce our ability to measure the quality-
of-life benefit to hosting an NFL team.  Instead of using the sample of suburban residents, we
estimated two additional regressions consisting of the entire MSA sample. The MSA sample
gives us an additional 4173 suburban observations for a total sample of 10,260 households. We
correct the standard errors for cluster sampling, as well as for heteroskedasticity in both
regressions.  The findings for these regressions are reported in Table 5.  The first regression
shown in the table is based on the MSA sample.  The findings using the MSA sample are highly16
consistent with those from the central city sample.  The coefficient of the NFL dummy variable
indicates that a 7.3 percent rental premium exists in MSAs that host an NFL team, about a
percentage point lower than found for this variable when only central city observations were
used. Still, the findings for broader MSA samples support the results for central city samples and
suggest that hosting an NFL franchise strongly contributes to the quality-of-life in metropolitan
areas. In the next regression we added an additional variable that allows the NFL dummy
variable to interact with the dummy variable indicating whether a household resides in the
MSA’s central city (assigned a value of zero) or suburb (assigned a value of unity).  This variable
should isolate the differential quality-of-life benefit suburban residents receive from the presence
of an NFL team.  The coefficient on this variable is positive and marginally significant,
suggesting that, on average, the amenity benefit derived by suburban residents is greater than
that for central city residents, in that it implies a 10 percent rental premium for suburban
households.   
3. The Effect of NFL Franchises on Wages
The theory of compensating differentials suggests that any amenity that increases the
quality of life and pushes up the cost of housing will have a similar, though opposite, effect on
wages.   A rise in quality of life will (as before) attract new residents and therefore push the
supply of labor curve to the right.  If the demand for labor in the city is downward sloping, this
will cause wages to fall, although in the short to medium run, the demand for labor is perhaps
more elastic than the supply of housing, and this may tend to ameliorate the effect.  In addition,
as Roback (1982) notes,  if the amenity is productive, the demand for labor could also be moved
to the right, and the effect on wages is ambiguous.  It is therefore of interest to measure the effect
of NFL franchises on city wages as well.17
Our methodology is similar to that employed in the rent equations above.  In this analysis
we employed the 1993 and 1999 March Supplements to the Current Population Survey and
collected information on respondents who live in one of the 60 largest MSAs.  This information,
summarized in Table 6, includes a number of indicators on the individual demographic and
employment characteristics, including binary variables for sex, ethnic group, attainment of a
college degree, and veteran status.  We also included a large number of dummy variables for
employment in various industries and various job classifications.  Finally, we also included all of
the various MSA characteristics and dummy variables used in the rent equation above.  Wages
were measured by taking the individual’s annual earnings (as reported in the CPS) and dividing
by the number of  “usual hours worked.”8  Since the MSA represents the local labor market, the
wage rate for workers with similar skills and characteristics should be roughly the same in the
MSA’s central city or suburbs.
The results were imprecise.  The results presented in Table 7 are representative of our
overall findings for a number of other specifications of the wage regression, which is that MSAs
with NFL franchises have lower wages. There is roughly a 4 percent discount to wages in such
areas.  However, the estimates are not precise enough to warrant the rejection of the null
hypothesis that there is no effect at the usual levels of significance — the t-statistic on the NFL
variable is –0.97; thus there is only a two-thirds chance that the true coefficient is negative. Other
specifications, including sub-sample regressions with just central city or just suburban
observations, or including state-time interactions, or just male or just female observations, had
slightly higher or slightly lower t-statistics.9
                                                          
8 Only a small minority of respondents report an hourly wage.  Because of this, we elected to use the above measure
of the implicit hourly wage.
9 The cluster weighting and robustness corrections applied to the standard errors in the rent equation are also applied
to the wage equation.18
While these results are certainly not confirmation of an NFL impact on wages, we view
them as mildly encouraging in the following sense. It might be thought that the NFL dummy
variable did not represent the effect of NFL teams, per se, but some unobserved characteristic
correlated with overall growth or economic climate — this despite our fairly careful attempts to
control for such unobservables. If this were the case, one might expect such a force to have a
positive effect on wages, since the growth probably raises the cost of living.
4. Conclusion
We find that the presence of an NFL franchise raises annual rents approximately 8
percent and that the standard error on the coefficient allows rejection of the usual null
hypothesis at any standard level of type I error.  The corresponding coefficient  from the
wage equation indicates that wages in NFL cities fall approximately 4 percent; however, the
coefficient is not significant at the usual levels.
Thus we find from the rent results in particular that NFL franchises do add to the quality
of life in U.S. metropolitan areas.  This, of course, is not the same thing as recommending that
cities immediately decide to fund stadiums if only because the opportunity cost of such
funds is the elimination of other, possibly more worthy programs.19
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Table 1: NFL CITIES in 1993 and 1999
City Yes if City Had an NFL team
in 1993
Yes if City Had an NFL team
in 1999















Kansas City YES YES




New England (Boston) YES YES
New Orleans YES YES




Saint Louis NO YES
San Diego YES YES
San Francisco  YES YES
Seattle YES YES
Tampa Bay YES YES
Washington, DC YES YES22
Table 2: MSA in Study
1999 Metropolitan Area
Population
1999 Central City Population
New York 20102875 7428162














San Diego 2820844 1238974









Kansas City 1755899 437764
Sacramento 1741002 406899
San Francisco 1685647 746777
Milwaukee 1648199 572424
San Jose 1647419 867675
Fort Worth 1629213 502369
San Antonio 1564949 1147213
Norfolk 1562635 225875
Indianapolis 1536665 738907
Fort Lauderdale 1535468 154021
Orlando 1535004 180308
Columbus 1489487 671247
Los Vegas 1381086 418658
New Orleans 1305479 460913
Passaic 1296252 61173









Grand Rapids 1052092 185009
West Palm Beach 1049420 76970
Oklahoma City 1046283 475322
Providence 907795 14988724
TABLE 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Variables from the Annual Housing Survey
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Log of Rent 6.21 0.47
Time Dummy 0.53 0.50
Building Age 45.73 24.21
Building Age Squared 2676.81 2257.31
Garage Dummy 0.29 0.44
No. of Bathrooms 1.14 0.43
No. of Bedrooms 1.75 0.87
No. of Half-Bathrooms 0.11 0.34
Dummy for Black 0.28 0.45
Minority other than Black
Dummy
0.13 0.34
Unit under Rent Control
Dummy
0.97 0.30




Public Sewer Dummy 0.99 0.08
Detached Dummy 0.14 0.35
Low-rise Dummy 0.76 0.43




Holes in Floor Dummy 0.03 0.17
Monthly Electricity Cost 51.35 37.0
Annual Income 19353.4 20585.15
Male 0.50 0.50
CITY/METRO DATA (VARIOUS SOURCES)
Violent Crimes Per Capita 1760.61 748.62
Air Quality Index 25.07 31.41
Unemployment Rate 7.18 2.65
NFL Status 0.68 0.47
Population Growth  0.043 0.11
Population Size 2356492 2486726
Northeast Dummy 0.25 0.43
West Dummy 0.21 0.41
South Dummy 0.28 0.4525













Time Dummy -0.2688*** -0.2749*** -0.2784*** -0.2688*** -0.0860
Building Age -0.0061*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0061*** -0.0061***
Building Age
Squared
0.00004*** 0.00005*** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00004***
Garage
Dummy
0.0558*** 0.0459*** 0.0454*** 0.0558*** 0.0575***
No. of
Bathrooms
0.1209*** 0.1049*** 0.1070*** 0.1209*** 0.1215***
No. of
Bedrooms
0.0836*** 0.0871*** 0.0248 0.0836*** 0.0831***
No. of Half-
Bathrooms
0.0292** 0.0288** 0.0288** 0.0292 0.0283
Dummy for
Black












-0.5950*** -0.5635*** -0.5691*** -0.5950*** -0.5837***
Public Sewer
Dummy
0.0644 0.0074 0.0314 0.0644 0.0676
Detached
Dummy
-0.0006 0.0045 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004
Low-rise
Dummy
-0.0757*** -0.0561*** -0.0635*** -0.0757*** -0.0757***
High-rise
Dummy




0.1767*** 0.1785*** 0.1776*** 0.1767*** 0.1763***
Holes in Floor
Dummy
-0.1199*** -0.0994*** -0.1026*** -0.1199*** -0.1183**
Monthly
Electricity Cost
0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
Annual Income 4.08e-06*** 3.43e-06*** 3.55e-06*** 4.08e-06*** 4.08e-06***
Male -0.0069 -0.0075 -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0067
Violent Crimes
Per Capita
0.00001 3.68e-06 5.33e-06 1.33e-05 7.21e-05
Air Quality
Index
0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008* 0.0008*** 0.0002***
Unemployment
Rate
0.0133 0.0177* 0.0177* 0.0072* 0.0034
Taxes Per
capita
0.00006 -0.00001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002*
Spending Per
capita
-0.0009** -0.00005*** -0.00006.** -0.0001*** -0.0000126
NFL Status 0.0843*** 0.0828*** 0.0837*** 0.0843*** 0.0813***
Population
Growth 
0.0877 0.0452 0.0547 0.0877 -0.1010
Population Size 9.36e-07*** 8.17e-07*** 8.34e-07*** 9.36e-07*** 3.01e-07
Constant 5.27*** 5.39*** 5.31*** 5.27*** 5.49***





R2 0.4336 0.4314 N/A 0.4336 0.4359
      *
, **
, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. 27
Table 5: Findings for MSAs: Rent Equation
Variable MSA Sample
MSA Sample w/ NFL
Interacted w/city -
suburban  dummy
Time Dummy -0.1225*** -0.1177***
Building Age -0.0057*** -0.0057***
Building Age Squared 0.00003** 0.00003***
Garage Dummy 0.0542*** 0.0543***
No. of Bathrooms 0.1180*** 0.1169***
No. of Bedrooms 0.0856*** 0.0860***
No. of Half-Bathrooms 0.0425** 0.0412***










Public Sewer Dummy 0.0067 0.01353
Detached Dummy -0.0010 -0.0029
Low-rise Dummy -0.0608*** -0.0651***




Holes in Floor Dummy -0.0999*** -0.1009***
Monthly Electricity Cost 0.0005*** 0.0004***





Air Quality Index 0.00001 -0.0001
Unemployment Rate 0.0122 0.0127
Taxes Per capita 0.0003*** 0.0003***
Spending Per capita -0.0000 -0.0000




Population Growth  0.1769** 0.1840**
Population Size 1.04e-07*** -1.08e-07
Constant 5.69*** 5.69***




, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels 
respectively.28
Table 6: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Variables from the Current Population Survey







Protection  0.019531 0.138383
Service 0.114636 0.318587
Precision 0.102015 0.302672





College Degree 0.285561 0.451688
=1 if  Male 0.513696 0.49982




Durable Goods Manuf. 0.089977 0.286153
Nondurable Goods Manuf. 0.058193 0.234112
TPUC 0.076066 0.265107
Wholesale Trade 0.041088 0.198498
Retail Trade 0.167148 0.373114
FIRE 0.074684 0.262884
Business Services 0.072258 0.258918
Personal Services 0.037096 0.189
Entertainment 0.020544 0.141855
Professional Services 0.243367 0.429121
Public Administration 0.049595 0.217109
=1 if black 0.117 0.321426
=1 if Asian heritage 0.044067 0.205247
Hourly wage 13.85284 11.49093
Crime rate index 1664.223 888.1901
Air Quality index 20.54081 23.85109
Per capita taxes 928.4103 905.0618
Per capita expenditure 2105.545 1656.976
Unemployment rate 4.471699 1.773501
Population growth rate 0.086381 0.09792
Population 3722160 2805191
NFL 0.647341 0.47780529
Table 7: Results from the Current Population
Survey
Violent Crimes Per Capita -5.4E-05
Air Quality Index 0.001347**
Unemployment Rate 6.56E-05***
Taxes Per capita -8.4E-05
Spending Per capita 0.045599*












       *
, **
, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
                and 1 percent levels respectively. The dependent variable is 
       the log of hourly wage. corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
       clustering of  observations. Also included were binary variables 
       for industry, job type and MSA of residence.